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Robert F. Barsky
à aider ceux qui désirent se déplacer en éliminant les
obstacles tels que les clauses des pays tiers, les restrictions
sur les visas et les billets d’avion à prix exorbitants, et qu’au
lieu de pénaliser ceux qui facilitent la réalisation du désir
naturel des gens de se déplacer, les officiels canadiens
devraient plutôt aider à trouver des moyens d’encourager la
circulation des gens quelles que soient les raisons que ces
derniers considèrent comme appropriées.
Debates about immigration policy often focus uponthe relationship between proposed laws and whatcame before, as opposed to more useful analysis
of what is really at stake: the movement of peoples within
and across artificial national and international boundaries;
the lines between public and private property; and the en-
forced divisions between areas where human beings are
allowed to be free, and areas in which they are, for what-
ever reason, trapped against their will. Along the way, it
would be useful to analyze the relationship between peo-
ples occupying different kinds of marginal spaces within
and beyond our own country, notably transitional spaces
like airports, judicial spaces like courtrooms, and privileged
spaces like private homes. To think in these terms forces us
to ponder fundamental issues underwriting proposed bills
such as c-31, and should lead us to consider the perversity
upholding laws designed to deny free movement to some
people—the poor, the suffering, the “other”—while con-
sidering it a fundamental right for others—the rich, the
well-connected, the powerful, and the “not-other.” As pres-
ently construed, the current migration system treats the
“others” as charity cases; we are made to believe that Canada
benevolently assists people who have been made to suffer
in their own countries. This makes us very generous and
very tolerant; we feel pretty good about ourselves and about
our country, and by extension we are led to support c-31,
which proposes to regulate how people can come into “our”
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This article argues that debate on Bill c-31 should, in fact,
focus upon the fact that it is impossible to determine the
veracity of refugee claims using current methods of adjudi-
cation, that Canadian refugee and immigration legislation
is incompatible with the international conventions, decla-
rations, and norms upon which it is said to be based, and
the absurdity of restricting the free movement of peoples.
Arguing that the immigration and refugee system already
favours free movement for the rich and the well-connected,
and that the proposed legislation will further punish those
who already suffer greatly from current restrictions, the
author suggests that Canada should work to assist those
who desire to move by eliminating obstacles such as third-
country clauses, visa restrictions, and prohibitively priced
airline tickets, and that rather than penalize those who
assist in people’s natural desire to move around, Canadian
officials should help find ways to encourage the movement
of peoples on whatever grounds they themselves think
appropriate.
Résumé
Cet article maintient que le débat autour du projet de loi c-
31 devrait en fait être dirigé sur les questions suivantes :
l’impossibilité de déterminer la véracité des demandes
d’asile en utilisant les méthodes actuelles de détermination,
l’incompatibilité qui existe entre, d’une part, la loi canadienne
sur l’immigration et le droit d’asile et, de l’autre, les Con-
ventions, Déclarations et normes internationales sur
lesquelles elle est sensée être basée, et, par ailleurs, l’absurdité
d’essayer de limiter la libre circulation des peuples. Arguant
que le système de l’immigration et du droit d’asile favorise
déjà la libre circulation des gens riches ayant de bonnes
relations, et que la nouvelle législation va punir encore plus
ceux qui souffrent déjà beaucoup sous les restrictions
existantes, l’auteur suggère que le Canada devrait travailler
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space, our country. As we read in the outset of this bill,
“The objectives for the refugee program recognize that refu-
gee protection is, in the first instance, about saving lives
and that providing fair consideration to those who come
to Canada claiming persecution is a fundamental expres-
sion of Canada’s humanitarian ideals.”
A second look at our benevolence and the noble efforts
aimed at “saving lives” demonstrates the wrong-headedness
of such views by the purely legalistic standards employed
to consider their cases, or even in the economic terms gen-
erally favoured by those on both sides of this argument.
For the sake of those who think that our economy ought
to regulate our ethics, it’s worth pointing out that refugees
arrive in our country generally as a last resort, and although
they are in desperate need of assistance, they are essential
not only for our economy, but for the diversity upon which
contemporary society thrives. Furthermore, a look at glo-
bal economics demonstrates that our standard of living is
partially dependant upon the types of corporate forays into
the cheap labour wells and the unregulated environmental
buffets of the Third World that create refugee problems.
Our national system is built upon the erection of barriers
that affect migration well beyond our borders. And our very
social structure is built upon the fruits of First World con-
trol over distant lands. This doesn’t mean that we ought to
have more liberal laws about migration to compensate for
our illiberal economic system; instead, we should really
question what it means to legitimize barriers, like Bill c-31,
which are aimed at limiting fundamental human rights,
such as freedom of movement.
It could be argued that to condemn refugee policy is a
poor choice to make in a country as generous to refugees
as Canada is perceived to be. And granted, the procedure
to adjudicate refugee claims is superior to the one used in
the United States and (with a few exceptions) in Europe.
Unfortunately, this isn’t saying much. Knowledge of the
international refugee situation should incite persons in the
First World to throw open their borders, rather than fall
for the false arguments that sell measures such as the Third
Country clause that c-31 takes for granted, the hardened
airline and visa rules that ensure that those most in need
will never see the light of a Canadian hearing room, and
the preposterous penalties proposed to halt the “illegal”
transportation of people seeking assistance. For, as serious
research demonstrates, refugee claimants don’t simply move
to Europe or America to gather up the gold that lines the
streets (a look at domestic poverty should be enough to
diffuse that argument). Indeed, the resistance of even the
most heavily persecuted claimants to the idea of leaving
their home, their family, and their friends is in the vast
majority of cases monumental, and their knowledge of
Canada (or other host countries) tends to be extremely
sparse. This only makes sense; why come and freeze in a
Canadian winter, in some small apartment in a crummy
area of a big unwelcoming city? Because our society hands
out free money to foreigners? Hardly. Because some peo-
ple might wish to come to our country to have a life, to
make a buck, to raise a family? Sounds pretty much like
everyone else to me.
My own studies have shown that people suffer consid-
erably before making the move to another country, like
Canada, and that once here they suffer again, but they work
hard to make the next generation survive. This is indeed a
kind of principle that is inscribed into a primary text for
refugee determination, the unhcr’s Handbook on Proce-
dures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, which
suggests in chapter 1, article 39, “It may be assumed that,
unless he seeks adventure or just wishes to see the world, a
person would not normally abandon his home and coun-
try without some compelling reason.” My experience con-
firms this point; most of the claimants I’ve interviewed over
the years took a decided financial loss when they came to
Canada, for the most part willingly, in exchange for safety
and protection for themselves and their families. This is
not to say that those granted refugee status in Canada don’t
strive to succeed. Quite the contrary. Studies over the years
by federal and provincial agencies have consistently shown
that in virtually every respect refugees make for better Ca-
nadians than Canadians do, by all the normal criteria of
measurement (less likely to go to prison, less likely to be
unemployed, more likely to educate their children, and to
a higher degree, less inclined to use social services, and more
likely to employ other Canadians). In short, the number of
restrictions on necessary migration is unnecessarily high,
and indeed the arguments generally employed to erect or
bolster the kinds of restrictions outlined in Bill-c-31 tend
to be founded upon phony premises, as opposed to con-
crete research that the government itself commissions.
But I don’t wish to make an argument for softening Bill
c-31, even as I nod in agreement with the effort it makes to
facilitate the claiming process for some “categories” of refu-
gees. I don’t even wish to promote a liberal policy towards
immigrants and refugees, even though it would certainly
be of some solace for a small number of persons consid-
ered eligible to benefit from such a remedy. My real inter-
est is elsewhere, and it leads me to one underlying hypoth-
esis, one idea, one proposal, which is on the one hand so
obvious that it doesn’t even deserve mention, and on the
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other hand so radical that it cannot even be uttered in dis-
cussions about refugee policy without scornful or dismiss-
ive rebuttals: People have the inalienable right to move around
as they wish, for whatever reason they think appropriate.
Period. Borders between states are an aberration, the idea
of the nation is reprehensible in its consequences, and re-
strictions imposed upon people who wish to travel from
one region of their world to another are absurd and hurt-
ful. Bill c-31 is wrong because it is built upon a premise
that simply makes no sense, that the “state” should exist
because it is in some way a natural form of organization
for human beings. In fact, as Chomsky points out,
The state system is a very artificial system. In its modern form
it developed in Europe, and you can see how artificial it is by
just looking at European history for the last hundreds of years,
a history of massacre, violence, terror, destruction, most of
which has to do with trying to impose a state system on a
society to which it has very little relation. As Europe expanded
over the rest of the world, pretty much the same thing hap-
pened—you look at Africa, India, Asia, any place you go,
they’ve got these boundaries which are the result of coloring
different colors on the map that usually have to do with Eu-
ropean colonization. They cut across all kinds of communi-
ties and interests and they bring people together who have
nothing to do with each other.
The result of this state system, as Chomsky points out,
is violence, warfare, struggle, oppression, and some
very sharply skewed distribution of power internally. The con-
centration of power inside usually takes over the state for its
own good. It suppresses other people, suppresses people out-
side, etc. So we’re stuck with this state system, for a while, at
least. But we shouldn’t expect it to be permanent. In fact, if
it’s a permanent condition, it isn’t going to last very long be-
cause it’s a lethal system. It’s a miracle that it has survived as
long as it did . . . From every point of view the state system
looks artificial in the sense that it’s unrelated to human needs
and imposed by certain interests and power distribution (Lan-
guage and Politics 745).
From this perspective, the problem of refugee studies is
a secondary one, because it grows out of a more funda-
mental issue, relating to the distribution of power and the
organization of peoples in contemporary society. For this
reason, I would simply suggest that the domain of refugee
studies shouldn’t exist, the category “refugee” shouldn’t
exist, and people employed to limit the movement of per-
sons from one place to another should be occupied with
other matters, such as the problem of assisting those who
would like to move to another region but cannot on ac-
count of limited resources.
A related hypothesis, clearly demonstrated once again
by any number of research projects, not to mention expe-
rience or common sense, is that any attempt to adjudicate
claims is not only inappropriate, but necessarily flawed, and
this for a whole host of reasons that, if we think about it,
hardly deserve mention. First, we couldn’t possibly tell
whether claimants “deserve” status according to the set of
laws in place to determine such things, because it isn’t pos-
sible to apply the existing criteria to all cases in a consistent
or justifiable manner. Second, we cannot employ the tools
of discourse analysis, no matter how sophisticated, to dis-
tinguish between truthful and untruthful statements in
refugee hearings except at a very superficial level (contra-
dictions, inconsistencies). Third, there are too many con-
flicting interests involved in groups that include a claim-
ant, an interpreter, an adjudicator, and a lawyer for there to
be much more than a mutual display of efforts aimed at
legitimizing the positions of each person involved. And
fourth, the obstacles placed before those who don’t repli-
cate the image we have of ourselves are so vast and insur-
mountable as to render moot any discussion about ways of
determining such silly categories as the “truth” of a claim.
Do contradictions in testimonies offered by people who
have had their genitals electrocuted by government em-
ployees in their country of origin prove that they are “ly-
ing” to government authorities in the host country?
Granted, laws do exist to establish legal categories in the
present-day system, but does abiding by the laws of the land
mean that governments can disregard international con-
ventions and treaties to which they are signatories? If we
were to take certain international conventions and treaties
seriously, conventions to which most countries of the world
are party, then we should be looking for ways to facilitate
rather than impede free movement, as we shall see. Finally,
and this returns us to the initial hypothesis, people simply
don’t have any business restricting other people from mov-
ing around, even if the motivation to do so is crass eco-
nomic gain, because the fact is, free movement is good for
individuals and good for societies in every discernible way.
This being the case, I’d also suggest that the road to radical
change—that is, the movement towards what is conven-
iently regarded as “idealist” or “utopian” and therefore not
worth pursuing—is my sense that we can and should do
better than we’re doing, and that eliminating barriers from
persons who would move if they could might be one small
step in that direction. It would be a significant improve-
ment, if only because it would mean that populations
wouldn’t necessarily have to be subjected to the lunatic ideas
of power mongers or hurtful economic systems, because
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they would have the knowledge required and the resources
needed to move to another more comfortable space. This
article should be a short one, therefore, and debate about
Bill c-31 should be similarly constrained, because the very
idea that persecuted peoples should have to justify their
flight from persecution before our legal or administrative
systems is, by any reasonable measure, hurtful to all peo-
ple, especially of course the poor, and counter-productive
for all members of society except for those who do the op-
pressing.
Simplifying and Clarifying Migration Procedures
This type of approach won’t be sufficient for those in search
of “protection” from people in flight, or those who hope to
“protect” the jobs of “ordinary Canadians” from “illegal”
migration, because no matter how obvious it is that peo-
ple ought to move around as they wish, there remains a
whole range of people and organizations who have inter-
ests, ultimately power interests, that will demand protec-
tion against those who have legitimate claims against them;
the people who work to protect these interests do so by
resorting to a series of false or hypocritical arguments, like
the ones we find in Bill c-31. For this reason, it’s worth iden-
tifying a few of the really nefarious passages of this bill and
then to show—again for those who prefer to support ar-
guments with reference to, say, legal documents—that even
according to the refugee laws and conventions employed
to legitimize our own refugee determination system, Bill
c-31, like all bills and acts that have preceded it in this coun-
try, don’t meet their own criteria. As such, they really aren’t
much more than purveyors and upholders of a status quo
that turns out to be extremely oppressive for all but a small
proportion of the earth’s inhabitants.
In the document “cic Canada—Bill c-31: What is New
in the Proposed Immigration and Refugee Protection Act”
we are treated at the very outset to the idea—implicit in
the fact that we need to replace the current act because it
“dates back to the 1970s”—that laws get worn out, some-
how, and need to be “updated.” This is interesting when
one considers laws about fundamental human rights, say,
the Canadian Charter of Rights, the American Bill of Rights,
or even our own constitution, because it suggests that fun-
damental human rights aren’t so “fundamental” after all,
and that even though the Immigration Act exists to fulfill
our obligations under previous conventions, it can some-
how get worn out. How can we legitimize building a soci-
ety upon the authority granted by a constitution, even as
we challenge the legitimacy of historical documents like
constitutions on the grounds that laws wear out? Bill c-31
doesn’t have any answers, but it does seem to suggest that
laws get worn out because they get too complicated over
time, on account of all the amendments and changes
brought to them, which leads to the “the need for immi-
gration policy and legislative reforms expressed in a clearer,
simpler and more coherent Act.” Let’s pursue this line for a
moment, because it’s more promising than most.
Bill c-31 runs 150 or so pages, so it doesn’t seem to qualify
according to its own criteria of clarity or simplicity; but
there are other legal instruments that do, such as the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, which, I imagine, most
Canadians support, or would support, if its ideas were dif-
fused. There are a few articles in here that apply to the Bill
c-31 terrain, such as article 5, which simply states, “No one
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment.” Most people would
agree with that, and it’s simple enough, so we could scrap
our immigration act and simply uphold that principle,
which would save many people from a lot of suffering, and
might even help change the political systems that create
oppression and persecution, because everybody would
know take that principle as fundamental and necessary, so
they’d expect it, or demand it, from those empowered to
act on their behalf.
Perhaps this clause isn’t precise enough, however, since
we are also talking in c-31 about movement of peoples who
have been affected by abusive treatment, so let’s look to my
personal favourite, article 13, which upholds the very clear,
simple and coherent idea that: “(1) Everyone has the right
to freedom of movement and residence within the borders
of each state. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any coun-
try, including his own, and to return to his country.” For
further precision, we might also add article 14, which, once
again, is as clear as can be on the issue of asylum: “(1) Eve-
ryone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries
asylum from persecution.” To ensure that this is properly
applied, we could end the act with article 2, which states,
“This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions
genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Na-
tions.”
Some legalistic soul might claim that the declaration
doesn’t have any more than a moral hold over our society,
that even though we apparently support it, we also have to
have specific legislation to make it work, such as the inter-
national treaties and conventions to which we are signato-
ries. Luckily, these legal instruments tend to be rather sim-
ple and clear, so they are indeed worth a look. Since the
framework and indeed the very legitimacy of our Immi-
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gration Act is based upon the 1951 unhcr Convention re-
lating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol, then
we certainly aren’t resorting to an irrelevant text if we
choose this one as a point of reference.
Article 1 of that convention says that a refugee is some-
one who, “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country; or who, not having a nationality and being out-
side the country of his former habitual residence as a re-
sult of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is un-
willing to return to it.” If, against my personal will, some-
one were to insist that free movement is not an inherent
right, and that states do and should exist, then this defini-
tion could apply, which means that someone should only
have to claim to fear persecution, which couldn’t really be
questioned (how can you question if someone has, accord-
ing to his or her experience, suffered? How could you prove
it one way or the other?), and this person should be granted
asylum. Again, I don’t favour this route, because it suggests
that we ought to adjudicate things, but since those who
support laws like c-31 like to be legalistic, then they should
at least be reading the legal texts that underwrite the laws
that they are choosing to support.
There might be other grounds for opposing the approach
I’m setting forth here. For instance, I would grant that if
Canada alone decided to promote free movement, we’d
likely have a few more citizens next year than had been
expected, and there would be some infrastructure prob-
lems in the short term, at least. As for the elimination of
states and the organization of society around other princi-
pals, this would have to be part of a larger effort, which is
worth working towards, in my opinion, if only in terms of
our attacking organizations and instruments of repression.
It is also true that if we were to follow the more legal route
suggested by the letter of the convention, then there’s the
problem that we’re not accounting for Canadian racism,
xenophobia, or the many wrong-headed ideas that are
thrown about, describing how “others” steal “our” jobs, for
example, and it doesn’t pander to government efforts to
blame the countries’ woes, or union efforts to blame the
companies’ woes, or lawmakers’ efforts to blame the mu-
nicipalities’ woes, upon the “other.” To address the real is-
sues of this hypothetical “other” would require that we face
the consequences of the innate inequality of the current
economic system—unemployment, unequal distribution
of wealth, a growing distance between the rich and the poor,
and between rich and poor nations—which is not addressed
in c-31, even though it is at the root of the problem that it
tries to address. Instead, c-31 suggests that the solution lies
in reducing the “flows” of “illegal” migrants, in impeding
our international (not to mention moral) obligation to
assist those in need, and in halting things that we law-
abiding citizens so loathe, like “queue jumping.” The fact
that it’s kind of hard to jump when you’re starving, tor-
tured, raped, and denied fundamental rights for some rea-
son doesn’t really matter.
Violations of International Principles at Every Level
It’s interesting to look at some of the details of c-31 to see
how it proposes to act on these “problems,” because over
and above its blatant efforts aimed at ensuring that Canada
doesn’t even live up to international standards for refugee
adjudication, it also puts into effect a range of policies aimed
at violating international law on a larger scale. For exam-
ple, c-31 distinguishes between refugees on the basis of such
ideas as how they came to Canada, and who helped them
succeed in this aim. This is interesting in terms of the con-
vention’s article 7, which insists, “Except where this Con-
vention contains more favourable provisions, a Contract-
ing State shall accord to refugees the same treatment as is
accorded to aliens generally,” and article 16, which insists,
“1. A refugee shall have free access to the courts of law on
the territory of all Contracting States; 2. A refugee shall
enjoy in the Contracting State in which he has his habitual
residence the same treatment as a national in matters per-
taining to access to the Courts, including legal assistance
and exemption from cautio judicatem solvi; and 3. A refu-
gee shall be accorded in the matters referred to in para-
graph 2 in countries other than that in which he has his
habitual residence the treatment granted to a national of
the country of his habitual residence.” This article makes it
clear that anyone making a claim should have a proper
hearing, and no mention here is made of how she man-
aged to make it to Canadian territory, since this really
shouldn’t be an issue. Indeed, since it’s unlikely that some-
one who has had difficulty in his country of origin will be
able to follow “normal” channels to come to Canada to
benefit from an internationally recognized right, then any
attempt to distinguish between refugees, or, for that mat-
ter, immigrants, in terms of limiting or denying them ac-
cess to a hearing, is illegitimate.
This is not the line taken by the proposed law, of course.
Indeed, the “law-abiding” spirit of c-31 has some terrific
legislation that aims to send out the real message of how
Canada considers poor people who try to move around;
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they are criminals, unless proven otherwise, and therefore
should be incarcerated at the whim and will of the bureau-
crats. “Reasonable” grounds for incarcerating people, which
are the present criteria, tend to be easy to find in the case of
refugees, as we saw with the Chinese who were incarcer-
ated en masse in Vancouver last year. Bill c-31 also adds
that “persons inside Canada, with the exception of persons
on whom refugee protection has been conferred and per-
manent residents, who fail to establish their identity for
the purpose of a proceeding under the Act may be subject
to arrest.” The potential for abuse is breathtaking, given
the problem of procuring documents if one has been per-
secuted in a country of origin. For some reason, c-31 in-
sists very heavily upon this point:
irb required to take into account a claimant’s lack of identifi-
cation when assessing credibility. Under the current Immi-
gration Act, lack of identification only becomes a factor in
the event of a split decision by the irb panel. It is a published
practice of the irb, however, that lack of documentation is a
factor in the assessment of a refugee’s credibility. Bill c-31 in-
creases transparency by expressly stating that lack of docu-
mentation, absence of a reasonable explanation for lacking
documentation, and failure to take reasonable steps to obtain
documentation are factors that must be considered by the irb
when assessing credibility.
This is one of the many areas in which a very simple
hypothesis applies, and should always be borne in mind
when considering treatment of those judged by some group
or another to be a suffering other: To the degree that some-
one is really in need of assistance, our system will act to en-
sure that such a person is refused.
It’s already hard to believe that under the current Immi-
gration Act it is illegal to use fraudulent documents, but
consider that Bill c-31 expands this to also make it an of-
fence to possess fraudulent documents. It is only obvious
that if you’re resorting to fraudulent documents you may
be following (bad) advice from someone who saved your
life, or you may be doing so because you couldn’t procure
authentic documents, a fact that wouldn’t be terribly sur-
prising if you’d been subjected to torture in the country of
origin. The fact is, if you have identification, you probably
left the country of origin by a simpler route than if you
were forced to procure false documents, or if you were ad-
vised to destroy your documents en route to Canada. If
you came by illegal means, then chances are you couldn’t
come by legal means, because illegal means tend to cost
more, are more dangerous, and are far less reliable. And if
you’ve given false testimony, you probably have received
faulty information about the adjudication process, perhaps
from somebody who was well-meaning and who other-
wise helped out considerably with some element of the
claim, like travel, which made his or her advice seem ac-
ceptable.
Instead of taking this obvious point into account, the
proposed law becomes even more draconian: “Under Bill
c-31 the offence of making misleading statements will in-
clude the withholding of material facts in regard to any
decision-making. This clarifies that the withholding of ma-
terial facts is a form of misrepresentation. Additionally, the
offence of counselling misrepresentation, currently limited
to the making of refugee claims, is broadened under Bill c-
31 to apply to all immigration matters.” Who are claimants
supposed to believe: those people who tortured them, or
refused them permission to leave their country, or the non-
official people who actually helped them? These people who
help persecuted peoples to fulfill their dream of escaping
persecution, since official channels are so limited as to help
but a tiny proportion of those in need, are by our stand-
ards criminals on par with murderers, according to the new
proposals, which include the possibility of life in prison
for persons caught “smuggling” ten or more persons.
The obscenity of this idea is blatant: what are people
who are ineligible for legitimate travel but eligible for refu-
gee status in Canada supposed to do? What if they can’t get
a passport, a visa, or the money required to leave the coun-
try? What if they are “wanted” for some crime in their coun-
try, like fighting against a dictatorship? Do we seriously
think they’ll be allowed to pass through the airport in the
nation’s capital unnoticed? Or through a border crossing?
The convention doesn’t talk much about the problem
of finding a safe haven in the first place, but it does offer
standards regulating related issues, such as the rights of
those who make claims in signatory countries, in article
28, which sets out the principle that
(1) The Contracting States shall issue to refugees lawfully stay-
ing in their territory travel documents for the purpose of travel
outside their territory unless compelling reasons of national
security or public order otherwise require, and the provisions
of the Schedule to this Convention shall apply with respect to
such documents. The Contracting States may issue such a
travel document to any other refugee in their territory; they
shall in particular give sympathetic consideration to the issue
of such a travel document to refugees in their territory who
are unable to obtain a travel document from the country of
their lawful residence; and (2) Travel documents issued to refu-
gees under previous international agreements by parties
thereto shall be recognized and treated by the Contracting
States in the same way as if they had been issued pursuant to
this article.
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The message here is clear: people aren’t criminals just
because they’re exercising their internationally recognized
right to free movement, and they aren’t to be treated as
such. And people who help them exercise their right to make
a claim ought not be punished, necessarily. Instead, they
should perhaps be hired by the Canadian government, or
by aid organizations concerned with helping those in need,
to find a way to travel to their destination. It is taken for
granted that we ought to adopt a policy similar to the one
whereby municipalities allow people to drink, allow peo-
ple to stay out late in bars, and then either close down, or
don’t operate, the late-night public transportation that is
essential to ensure that they can get home safely. Instead,
police are stationed near bars to catch those who have cho-
sen the logical way home, their own vehicle. Rather than
putting an effort into assisting with the transportation of
those in need of help, punitive, expensive policies are en-
acted that catch people and fine them, or don’t catch peo-
ple but later have to clean up the mess caused by ensuing
traffic accidents. The point is, people wouldn’t have to re-
sort to “illegal smugglers”—who in some cases render a
very valuable service, by the way—if visa restrictions, air-
line penalties, and inordinately expensive travel costs from
the Third to the First World weren’t the norm.
All of this is rather hard to fathom, perhaps, but one
must consider that the very idea of “illegal entry,” or com-
ing to another place by illegal means, is logically inconsist-
ent if we are dealing with refugees, and the convention rec-
ognizes this clearly. Article 31 states that
(1) The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on ac-
count of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, com-
ing directly from a territory where their life or freedom was
threatened in the sense of Article 1, enter or are present in
their territory without authorization, provided they present
themselves without delay to the authorities and show good
cause for their illegal entry or presence. (2) The Contracting
States shall not apply to the movements of such refugees re-
strictions other than those which are necessary and such re-
strictions shall only be applied until their status in the coun-
try is regularized or they obtain admission into another coun-
try. The Contracting States shall allow such refugees a rea-
sonable period and all the necessary facilities to obtain ad-
mission into another country.
The ideas of “penalties” deserves pause. First, it ought in
my sense to include user fees; while we’re mistreating those
who exercise their right to move around, it seems accept-
able to most that we might as well add user fees, that is, we
should add debt to the list of woes from which refugee
claimants have suffered. And for those who don’t obey the
rules, things get even worse:
Bill c-31 increases fines for general offences such as failure to
comply with a term or condition imposed under the Act, es-
caping lawful custody or detention, and employing persons
not authorized to work (on indictment from $5000 to a maxi-
mum of $50,000; on summary conviction from $1000 to a
maximum of $10,000).
The convention is, once again, clear on this: article 29
states, “(1) the Contracting States shall not impose upon
refugee duties, charges or taxes, of any description whatso-
ever, other or higher than those which are or may be levied
on their nationals in similar situations.” There seems to be
the belief, not unreasonable, that to help people integrate
into our society, they may as well get used to the idea of
crushing debts.
Keeping the System Transparent
There are two hopes for those who have been subjected to
the abuse regularly heaped upon those we consider mar-
ginal, such as refugees: one is to erect a solid appeal proce-
dure that can overturn some of the misguided decisions
regularly handed down, and the other is to make the pub-
lic aware of what goes on in these hearings by allowing some
access to documents if the claimant is in agreement. As to
the first, the way that c-31, and other bills of its kind, en-
sure that it’ll be the poor who will suffer is to limit the
rights refugee claimants have to appeals, and then limit the
rights they have even if they are granted an appeal. For in-
stance, there is a new proposal in c-31 suggesting that there
should no longer be automatic stay of removal for judicial
review of refugee decisions: “The current Immigration Act
provides a stay of removal in most cases when judicial re-
view is initiated following unsuccessful refugee applications.
Although there is no automatic stay in Bill c-31, the new
regulations will provide such a stay subject to a two-year
sunset clause.” This comes in addition to all sorts of ways
of limiting appeal rights to claimants and to sponsors, al-
ready threatened under the current system. The potential
for abuse, and the spectre of misused discretion, grows
when vague passages are added to the collection of ways to
discourage or rule out people; to take but one example from
c-31: “No appeal by sponsors in cases of misrepresentation
except in respect to a sponsor’s spouse, common-law part-
ner or child.” Or, worse still, “Currently, the iad can reo-
pen an appeal at any time to hear new evidence. There has
been an increase in requests for re-openings and there is
concern that this is often a tactic to delay removal. Under
Bill c-31 the reopening of appeals may only be granted on
the basis that the iad failed to observe a principle of natu-
ral justice and only if the appellant is still in Canada. This
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provides some finality to the appeal process.” Does it ever!
And it even applies to overseas visa refusals, which, in my
experience, is as unpredictable and inconsistent a proce-
dure as could be imagined: “New leave requirement for
judicial review of overseas visa refusals. This makes judi-
cial review for overseas cases consistent with in-Canada
cases which all require leave. This will also help to ease re-
source requirements and Federal Court backlogs as the
number of overseas applications for judicial review has risen
substantially over the last few years.” The problem with this
is that when the rate of appeals goes up, it’s often because
decisions are erroneous. And the fact that repeat claims will
no longer be allowed, and that claims will be eligible for
termination in light of “new information” brought forward,
again heightens insecurity and makes it such that people
who have received inaccurate information about the claim-
ing process will be penalized and will be left without re-
course. Obviously, recourse for flawed decisions isn’t nec-
essary if original decisions make sense, but in so many cases
they simply don’t, and this despite the presence of two
members of whom only one needs to see the validity of the
case. To make matters worse now, c-31 is proposing single-
member panels, which “would be the norm for all irb di-
visions with ability for the Chairperson to appoint three-
member panels (except for the Immigration Division)
where appropriate.” Given the studies that have turned up
overt racism, errors of law, errors of judgment, and a range
of game-playing inside the hearings, the combination of
too much discretion, one doesn’t have to work hard to im-
agine the potential for abuse in a system that relies upon
single-panel hearings and limited possibilities for appeal-
ing asinine decisions.
On the second issue, ensuring that people have access to
information about what goes on in irb hearings, so that
they can understand some of the errors of judgment and
law that occur therein, or so that they can themselves pre-
pare for a hearing, is to make information about what goes
on in these hearings accessible. c-31 proposes to curb this,
by offering
new provisions for non-disclosure of information at irb hear-
ings. Currently, the Minister may apply to the Federal Court
to protect information with respect to appeal hearings. There
are no provisions to protect sensitive security information
during immigration inquiries for determining admissibility.
Under Bill c-31, the Minister may apply for non-disclosure of
information at an appeal or admissibility hearing. The pre-
siding irb member would make a determination on such re-
quests by following the same rules followed by the Federal
Court when reviewing security certificate cases. The new pro-
visions expand the ability to protect information and provide
a simpler process that eliminates the need, at irb hearings, to
seek recourse to the Federal Court. In the interests of natural
justice, the person will receive a summary of the information
or evidence as well as an opportunity to be heard regarding
their case.
Once again, the potential for abuse of this power is vast,
and this problem is probably heightened by the new in cam-
era rules proposed in this bill, which are to apply to all four
divisions of the irb.
Safe Third Country
The next area that Bill c-31 takes for granted concerns an
idea that previously surfaced in another twisted bill known
as c-55. This area deserves special mention because it is
one of a growing range of weapons (prohibitive costs of
tickets for travel from the Third to the First worlds, visa
restrictions, fear mongering) used against those who would
dare try to set foot upon our soil to effect their interna-
tionally recognized right to claim status. C-55, adopted into
c-31, legalizes the category of the “safe third country,” a no-
tion that violates the fundamental principle of the con-
vention, article 33, concerning the prohibition of expulsion
or return (refoulement): “(1) No Contracting State shall
expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner what-
soever to the frontiers of territories where his life or free-
dom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion.” Practising sneaky refoulement, already
widespread, will get worse with c-31. For instance, “Airlines
to be able to provide prescribed passenger information to
cic. This provision will be used to identify passengers who
are inadmissible to Canada or for whom there is a warrant
for arrest. Passenger information will only be used in the
administration or enforcement of the Act.” There is no such
provision under the current Immigration Act.
As far as the convention is concerned, the “safe third
country” clause is illegitimate because claimants have rights
to make claims where they wish, subject to a small number
of guidelines. Goodwin-Gill (The Refugee in International
Law, 1996) notes that article 31 comes closest to dealing with
this issue: “Refugees are not required to have come directly
from their country of origin, but other countries or terri-
tories passed through should also have constituted actual
or potential threats to life or freedom.” What is unclear in
section 31 “is whether the refugee is entitled to invoke arti-
cle 31 when continued flight has been dictated more by the
refusal of other countries to grant asylum, or by the opera-
tion of exclusionary provisions such as those on safe third
country, safe country of origin or time limits” (152), all of
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which is of special concern for the countries in question.
The “safe third country” clause has been the subject of much
contestation, and the description of this clause takes many
forms, depending upon the country in question. In Canada,
legislation covering this issue came into effect in 1993 with
the passage of Bill c-86, which states,
46.01 (1) A person who claims to be a Convention refugee is
not eligible to have the claim determined by the Refugee Di-
vision if the person
(a) . . .
(b) came to Canada, directly or indirectly, from a country other
than a country of the person’s nationality or, where the per-
son has no country of nationality, the country of the person’s
habitual residence, that is a prescribed country under para-
graph 114(1)(s).
As Goodwin-Gill notes, however, the “safe country” pro-
visions of the Immigration Act have existed since 1988, but
“were not implemented for a variety of practical and po-
litical reasons” (ibid. 336). Nevertheless, agreements have
been made (or are under negotiation) between countries,
including Canada and the U.S., and Canada and Europe,
to move in this direction. Already the Dublin and Schengen
conventions have as objectives “to determine which par-
ticipating State is responsible for deciding the asylum claim
of an individual within the area of application; to provide
in appropriate cases for the readmission of the individual,
and for the exchange of information; and to confirm the
responsibility of the State for the removal of unsuccessful
applicants from the European Union or Schengen terri-
tory, as the case may be” (337). And Loescher notes that
by the end of 1992, ec government ministers had proposed
sending prospective asylum seekers back to the first “safe”
country they transited on their way to Western Europe. Ger-
many has separately negotiated agreements with Romania and
Bulgaria to return rejected asylum seekers in exchange for fi-
nancial incentives and has indicated its intention to reach simi-
lar agreements with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary
(Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global
Refugee Crisis, 1993, 126).
Previously in Canada there had been vague reference to
the need for a committee to advise the Minister on pro-
scribing countries that would be “safe” (the Immigration
Act 1976-77, c. 52, s. 114(5)). In c-86 the legislators have been
more forthright, “prescribing, for the purpose of sharing
responsibility for the examination of persons who claim to
be Convention refugees, countries that comply with Arti-
cle 33 [“Prohibition of expulsion or return - Refoulement”]
of the Convention” (R.S. c.28, 4th supp., ss. 29(3),(4)). This
could be interpreted to mean that if you leave your coun-
try of origin, whatever the circumstances, and you stop over
in one or several “safe” countries while en route, then you
will be returned to one of those countries through which
you passed. As a result, many asylum seekers would be
stopped en route through a transit country because of visa
requirements—another barrier to safe transit, particularly
for countries (like Canada) that are far afield from many
claim countries and therefore less likely to be on direct flight
routes. So once again, although in apparent violation of
the spirit (if not the letter) of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees, the Protocol to the Convention, and the Decla-
ration on Territorial Asylum, this clause (and others like
it) has been invoked and utilized with a high degree of suc-
cess to limit the flow of refugees, in particular those mov-
ing from the Third to the First World. These clauses are
particularly nefarious in Europe, given the number of flights
that necessarily stop there, and it seems to violate a number
of Council of Europe recommendations, including Rec-
ommendation 434 (1965), article 11 (ii and iii); Resolution
14 (1967), articles 1 and 2; Recommendation 773 (1976), sec-
tion ii; Recommendation 817 (1977), article 14; the Decla-
ration on Territorial Asylum (1977); and Recommendation
R (1981), sections 1 to 6. If the tenets of such a clause were
to be invoked, particularly in a systematic fashion by im-
portant “turnstile” airports such as Amsterdam-Schiphol,
London-Heathrow, Geneva-Cointrin, and Zürich-Kloten,
then the possibility that persons could flee from persecu-
tion with the hope of asylum in a safe country that is far
from the country of origin would be significantly dimin-
ished, particularly for the poor and the disenfranchised.
Conclusion
It would be pointless to reiterate the obvious, that Bill c-31
is simply further evidence of a quest for power and a ha-
tred of any other that doesn’t provide a positive reflection
of what we are sending off as Canadian standards to every-
one who comes knocking at our door. What is wrong with
“safe third country” clauses is what is wrong with immi-
gration acts generally speaking: they are designed to keep
out the people we are supposed to be helping. Examples
abound, but a few might show just how our immigration-
resistant walls are erected. Persecuted persons rarely have
the material means, the documentation, or the connections
needed to make direct flights abroad. Members of the Peo-
ple’s Party of Pakistan fleeing persecution from the sym-
pathizers of the Muslim-League Party in the Punjab, for
example, are forced to take overland routes to (say) India
to flee their oppressors, just as persons fleeing government
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agents in (say) Togo, take overland routes to Ghana (and
vice-versa), Russian Jews fleeing the long arm of Pamyat
(the notorious anti-Semitic organization that emerged in
the mid-1980s) could take overland routes to Europe, and
so forth. But persecution seldom ends in neighbouring
countries, for the arm of persecuting authorities is often
long enough to extend beyond its borders; it is often the
case that the source of persecution in a country of origin
continues to be a source of persecution in a neighbouring
country (Ahmadi Muslims in Pakistan will not find India
any more welcoming, Jews in Kazakhstan will not find
Russia any less anti-Semitic, Russian half-Jews in Israel will
not find much comfort in Syria, and so forth). The “third
country” clause, by acting against persecuted persons who
don’t have the means to seek asylum in the First World,
keeps the results of First World intervention, Third World
dictatorial practices, regional conflicts, and home-grown
oppression within the confines of the state in question, or
at least restricts its spread much beyond neighbouring
countries.
As is always the case, the exceptions to the “third coun-
try” rule apply to those who can afford intercontinental
travel documents and tickets with the proper (i.e., the most
expensive) routing, just as the exceptions to the rule that
it’s hard to tell one’s story in a way that we like to hear it,
without the assistance of a hotshot lawyer, apply to those
who can afford to shell out the big bucks. We shouldn’t be
surprised by any of this, given the nature of the economic
system within which we live, but we ought perhaps to be,
at least, disgusted.
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